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Legal Ethics
by Roy M. Sobelson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article covers the rules, cases, ethics opinions, and other matters
decided by the Georgia Supreme Court, the Georgia Court of Appeals,
and a federal district court between June 1, 1998, and May 31, 1999,
that have most affected, or may affect, Georgia lawyers. Many eyepopping headlines about lawyers and their profession filled the survey
period. Although very few of the underlying cases made or changed any
substantive law, they may well have substantially altered the landscape
of lawyering, creating or illuminating various pitfalls and land mines.
One Georgia lawyer, disbarred for murdering his landlord, avoided the
Moreton
death penalty only after he finally admitted his guilt.'
Rolleston, considered by many to be something of a legend in Atlanta
legal circles, continued his assault on the record for the longest time and
most motions filed to avoid paying a malpractice judgment against him.2
A judge in north Georgia, a convicted felon before he took the bench, was
removed, at least in part, for improper actions in office.' Two lawyers
generated both local and national controversy when they collected a huge
fee in a personal injury case, leaving their deceased client's family with
virtually nothing. At least one of them found it impossible to comply
with a judge's order to place the large sum in the court registry because
he had already spent it. 4 In another case, the Supreme Court noted

* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Emory University (B.A.,
with honors, 1972); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1976); Temple
University School of Law (LL.M., 1982).
1. See In re Lumpkin, 271 Ga. 15, 515 S.E.2d 147 (1999); see also Trisha Renaud,
Lumpkin Agrees to Spend Life in Prison,Admits '96 Murder, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,

Feb. 25, 1999, at 1.
2. See Jonathan Ringel, Loserof Big MalpracticeCase Battles Insurer,FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Feb. 22, 1999, at 1.
3. See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
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with disapproval a district attorney's hiring of a capital murder
defendant's lawyer during the criminal trial, but the court refused to
reverse based on that conflict alone.5 Finally, in a criminal contempt
matter arising out of discovery in a products liability case, a federal
judge entered a consent judgment assessing a large monetary penalty
against a litigant and its law firm and ordering the money to be used in
a way that is probably unique in American legal history.6
II. RULES CHANGES
While there are some cases and developments of more immediate
influence and interest, the most important development has not yet come
to fruition. In the April 1999 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal, the
State Bar of Georgia published notice of its intent to move to amend the
lawyer discipline rules.7 In essence, the proposal would repeal Georgia's
disciplinary rules, which are based on the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"),' and replace them with a modified
version of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules").' The proposed rules differ from the Model Rules, however, in
several material respects. If these rules are adopted as proposed, they
could cause some substantial changes in the way Georgia lawyers
practice.
The Scope section of the proposed rules makes clear that their purpose
"is not to give rise to a cause of action nor to create a presumption that
a legal duty has been breached .... They are not designed to be a basis

5.
6.
7.

See infra notes 247-57 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
See Notice of Motion to Amend State Bar Rules, GA. BAR J., Apr. 1999, at 99. This

notice contains the text of the proposed rules discussed in this Article. As of August 30,
1999, the proposal was still before the supreme court, but no official action has been
announced. Telephone Interview with William P. Smith, III, General Counsel, State Bar
of Georgia (Aug. 30, 1999). If approved, the proposed rules would be denominated the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.
8. Approved by the ABA in 1966, most states, including Georgia, quickly adopted the
Model Code in whole or in part. Georgia's version is unique because it includes Standards
of Conduct ("Standards"), which the supreme court adopted in 1976, and because it
denominates the ABA Disciplinary Rules as Directory Rules ("DRs"). The DRs are
aspirational only.
9. Approved by the ABA in 1983, forty-one states have adopted these rules in whole or
in part as of 1997. STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS xix
(1999).
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for civil liability." ° However, many courts have all but ignored this in
recent years.1 '
Proposed Rule 1.1 requires lawyers to provide competent representation.12 Oddly, after stating that obligation, the proposed rule incorpo-

rates the Model Code's admonition that lawyers should not handle
matters beyond their competence without associating another lawyer
who is competent to handle it,'" a toothless tiger if there ever was one.
The proposed rule also appears to apply to lawyers who take cases that
they are competent to handle but who handle them in a sloppy manner.
The rule specifically requires that lawyers handle all matters with "the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
a lawyer could be
necessary," 4 thereby creating the possibility that
5
disbarred for handling a matter incompetently.
Proposed Rule 1.5(e) 16 is significant mostly because it would bring
the rules into conformity with what may already be a widespread
practice. The existing rules provide that a lawyer may share a fee with
a nonpartner only if the two lawyers' shares of the fees reflect the
amount of work each performed.' 7 Under the proposed rule, lawyers
may agree to share fees either in proportion to their share of the work
or by written agreement, as long as each lawyer assumes joint responsibility, the client is advised that the fees are being shared, and the total
fee is reasonable.' 8

10.

PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Scope.

11. See, e.g., Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, 265 Ga. 374, 374-77, 453
S.E.2d 719, 719-22 (1995) (holding that, although the Georgia Bar Rules cannot provide the
sole basis for legal malpractice liability, they are relevant to the standard of care to the
extent that they are intended to protect people in a position similar to the plaintiff's or are
addressed to the kind of injury that the plaintiff suffered); see also CENTER FOR PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR AS N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT xix-xxiii (3d ed. 1996) (discussing some of the uses ethics rules have in litigation
in various jurisdictions).
12. PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Contrast this rule with Proposed Rule 1.3, which requires that lawyers act with
reasonable diligence and promptness, a new affirmative requirement for Georgia lawyers.
PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3. Immediately after stating that
obligation, however, the rule equates the lack of diligence with abandonment of a matter,
which is a much more serious matter and is much more difficult for a prosecutor to prove.
Id. This virtually eliminates the possibility that a lawyer could be found to have violated
the rule in normal circumstances.
16. PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e).
17. RULES & REGS. FOR THE ORG. & GOV'T OF THE ST. BAR OF GA. DR 2-107(A)(2)
[hereinafter GA. BAR RULES].
18. PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e).

356

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

Proposed Rule 1.6"9 deals with confidentiality, which is one of the
most important issues regarding lawyer behavior. The proposed rule is
an interesting hodgepodge of old and new rules. It defines confidential
information as "all information gained in the professional relationship
with a client, including information which the client has requested to be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
likely be detrimental to the client."2 ° This definition departs from the
existing rule by adding the word "including," which suggests that there
are other types of information protected as well, but the proposed rule
does not make that clear. Additionally, the existing rule explicitly
protects confidences, which are defined as "information [protected] by the
attorney-client privilege."2 1
When the ABA adopted the Model Rules in 1983, it deliberately
omitted the distinction between a "confidence" and a "secret" in part
because it was confusing to have two different categories of information,
especially when one of them merely referred to the local law of attorneyclient privilege.2 2 In their place, the Model Rules extended protection
to "information relating to representation of a client." 23 The 1983
change had two main effects other than reducing the confusion created
by the multiple categories. First, by covering all information relating to
the representation, the Model Rules eliminated the need for a lawyer to
determine whether disclosure of certain information would be detrimental or embarrassing or whether the client had requested that it be kept
confidential. Second, and perhaps more important, it broadened the
scope of protected information. The Model Code's phrase "information
gained in the professional relationship" in Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A)
could be read to include either a temporal limitation (i.e., only covering
information gained duringthe representation) or a causal limitation (i.e.,
only covering information gained because of the representation). The use
of the broader phrase "relating to the representation" eliminated any
need to resolve that dilemma, to consult the law of attorney-client
privilege, or to figure out any potential distinctions between "confidence"
and "secret." However, adoption of the proposed rule would continue the

19.

PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6.

20. PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a); cf GA. BAR RULES
DR 4-101(A) ("'[Slecret' refers to other information gained in the professional relationship
that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client."); GA. BAR RULES Rule 4-102(d),
Standard 28 (same).
21. GA. BAR RULES DR 4-101(A).
22. Cf GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 9, at 70-71.
23. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a).
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existing ambiguities and create a new one-clarifying the significance of
the word "including."
In at least one way, the proposed rule is superior to Model Rule 1.6.
The proposed rule explicitly allows lawyers to disclose information when
"required by these rules or other law, or by order of the Court,"2 4 an
exception only implied in the Model Rules.25 In addition, the proposed
rule differs radically from Model Rule 1.6, although there will undoubtedly be disagreement about whether the difference is good or bad. The
proposed rule would allow disclosure "to avoid or prevent harm or
substantial financial loss to another as a result of client criminal
conduct,"26 whereas Model Rule 1.6 allows disclosure that is necessary
"to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm." 27 The proposed rule also makes one excellent addition to the
Model Rule by specifying that "the lawyer must make a good faith effort
to persuade the client
not to act or, if the client has already acted, to
2s
warn the victim."
Conflicts of interest are very difficult for lawyers, and the rules have
always been woefully vague in defining them, thus leaving even the most
conscientious lawyer at risk of unwittingly violating the rules. On this
count, Proposed Rule 1.7, while not making any radical change, does
make one substantial improvement by explicitly stating that there are
some situations in which conflicts may not be waived.29 Perhaps the
most serious of these situations is addressed in section (c)(2), which
provides that a client cannot consent to representation that "includes the
assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by
the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding."" Presumably, this rule would prohibit the oft-used, but criticized, practice of
representing both husband and wife in a divorce.
Proposed Rule 1.9, which deals with representation of a client whose
interests are materially adverse to a former client's interests, states the
traditional "substantially related" principle. 1 It does not, however,

24.
25.

PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a).
See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING

§ 1.6:310 (2d ed. 1990).
26.

PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1)(i).

27. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1). Relatively few states
have adopted the ABA's rule verbatim, and some have substantially broadened the
exceptions. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 9, at 75-79.
28. PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3).
29. PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(c).
30. PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(c)(2).
31. PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9.
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appear to incorporate the Yerby 2 test, which broadens the disqualification by prohibiting the representation of a client against a former client
in a matter of the same general subject matter and which arose while
the lawyer represented the former client."3 Because Yerby was decided
by the supreme court and has never been overruled, the court's adoption
of Proposed Rule 1.9 would surely draw the vitality of that principle into
question.
Proposed Rule 1.10, which imputes disqualification of a lawyer to
other lawyers in the firm,34 would put a reasonable limitation on the
effects of disqualification, basically opening the door to a limited form of
screening. Specifically, it would provide that if a lawyer in a firm was
disqualified from handling a matter, that lawyer's departure from the
firm would eliminate the remaining lawyers' imputed disqualification,
as long as no other lawyer in the firm had gained confidential information about the matter. 5 The current rule has never been clear as to
whether a disqualification, once applied to any lawyer in a firm, applies
to all other lawyers in the firm, regardless of whether they had access
to information or whether the disqualified lawyer left the firm.
Proposed Rule 3.3 would, for the first time, raise the possibility of
sanctioning a lawyer for failing to take appropriate remedial measures,
including notifying the court or the potentially affected person, after
While Georgia's Directory
unknowingly presenting false evidence."
Rules currently require a lawyer whose client commits perjury or fraud
on the tribunal to report the matter to "the affected person or tribunal,"3 7 the rule has never been made the subject of a Standard, thus
making the admonition aspirational only.
The adoption of Proposed Rule 3.738 would also end one of Georgia's
disciplinary rules' enduring mysteries-why Georgia has retained Canon
19 of the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics as the model for its
advocate-witness rule. This rule is odd in many respects, not the least

32. Crawford W. Long Mem'l Hosp. of Emory Univ. v. Yerby, 258 Ga. 720, 373 S.E.2d
749 (1988).
33. Id. at 721-22, 373 S.E.2d at 751.
34.
35.
36.
37.

PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10.
PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(b).
PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4).
GA. BAR RULES DR 7-102(B)(1). Georgia did not adopt the 1974 amendment to ABA

Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), which limited the duty to make such disclosures by adding
the phrase, "except when the information is protected as a privileged communication." The
ABA ethics committee interpreted this phrase to include both privileged and secret
information. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341
(1975). This interpretation might effectively vitiate any duty to report perjury. CHARLES
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 658 (student ed. 1986).
38. PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7.
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of which is that it has never become part of the Standards. 39 The
proposed rule would also eliminate two other questions about the rule,
although it will not resolve the debate over the reason for the rule's very
existence.4'
Under Georgia's current advocate-witness rule,4' two
things have always been unclear. The first is whether a lawyer's
disqualification under the rule should be imputed to all other lawyers in
the firm.42 The proposed rule would severely limit the instances in
which an entire firm would be disqualified. Second, it would eliminate
the current rule's language that oddly suggests that if a lawyer is put in
the position of being both advocate and witness, that lawyer should drop
the role as witness and continue as advocate.4 3 The current rule
conflicts with the lawyer's fiduciary duty to act in the client's best
interests because it is much easier to pick one's lawyer than to pick one's
witnesses.
Proposed Rule 8.3 provides that a lawyer should inform the appropriate authority if he has knowledge that "another lawyer has committed
a violation ...

that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's

honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.""
This proposal is significant in at least two respects. First, it eliminates
the circuitous, unenforced, and perhaps unenforceable current rule that
a lawyer should inform the authorities of another lawyer's violation of
any disciplinary rule.4 This rule seems to encompass so many possible
sins that it has been largely disregarded. Second, the proposed rule is
not mandatory. Indeed, that point is made twice-first by using the
word "should" instead of "shall," and second by explicitly stating that
there is no disciplinary penalty for a violation.46

39. Because virtually all local court rules address the advocate-witness dilemma, it may
be a moot point to address it in a code of ethics anyway. See, e.g., N.D. GA. R. 39.3(B)(3);
S.D. GA. R. 83.6(g).
40. For an illuminating discussion about the inconsistency of the Model Code's
justifications for the advocate-witness rule, see WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 377-78.
41. See GA. BAR RULES DR 5-102.
42. The current rules suggest not. Georgia's advocate-witness rule provides that "when
a lawyer is a witness for his client ... he should leave the trial of the case to other
counsel," but it does not make clear whether the other counsel must be from another firm.
GA. BAR RULES DR 5-102. Georgia's imputed disqualification rule applies only to
disqualification under DR 5-105, which does not include a prohibition on lawyers appearing
as witnesses on behalf of their clients. GA. BAR RULES DR 5-105(d).
43. GA. BAR RULES DR 5-102 ("Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer
should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.").
44.

PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a).

45.
46.

GA. BAR RULES DR 1-103.
PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3.
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Finally, Proposed Rule 8.4 makes it a violation, the maximum
punishment for which is disbarment, to "be convicted of a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the
lawyer's fitness to practice law."47 This proposal essentially adopts the
rule already established by case law.48 Conversely, any felony convic-

tion is grounds for disbarment, regardless of whether it involves moral
turpitude or whether it is related to fitness to practice law.49
III.

FORMAL ADVISORY OPINIONS

In the past couple of years, the supreme court has issued more than
the usual number of Formal Advisory Opinions ("FAOs"). This year was
no exception, with the court issuing six opinions, and the Formal
Advisory Opinion Board filing one with the court and releasing two for
comment. FAO 97-1 deals with lawyers working as temporary employees. ° The opinion reads like a primer on professional responsibility by
defining the obligations lawyers owe their clients and emphasizing that
temporary lawyers are subject to the same duties as other lawyers It
further makes the obvious but helpful point that firms hiring temporary
lawyers must be especially sensitive to the potential for conflicts and act
accordingly. However, this opinion must be read carefully to avoid
getting the wrong impression about one crucial point. On more than one
occasion, the opinion suggests that temporary lawyers should be
screened from confidential information that is not related to their
assignment. Because the purpose of screening is generally to avoid the
imputation of conflicts, the opinion could be interpreted as a suggestion
that screening would protect the firm from being disqualified in a matter
if the temporary employee was disqualified because of prior employment.
However, no Georgia case has ever approved such a concept, and this
opinion should probably not be taken to suggest otherwise. The purpose
of screening temporary employees is merely to fulfill the obligation to
limit the disclosure of confidential information as much as possible,
which may include keeping temporary employees working on unrelated
matters completely "out of the loop."5'
The question posed in FAO 97-3 was, "Whether it is ethically
permissible for a departing attorney to send a communication to clients

47.

PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(a)(3).

48. See In re Williams, 266 Ga. 132, 464 S.E.2d 816 (1996).
PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(a)(2).
50. Ga. Sup. Ct., Formal Advisory Op. No. 97-1 (June 5, 1998), available in STATE BAR
OF GA. 1998-1999 DIRECTORY & HANDBOOK 98-H to 99-H [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
51. GA. BAR RULES Rule 4-102(d), Standard 29.
49.
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of the former law firm?"5 2 The opinion immediately makes the correct
but often misunderstood point that "[a] client is not the property of a
certain attorney.""3 This suggests that no lawyer has a right to expect
or demand to provide representation to any client54 and that lawyers
are thus free to offer their services to anybody, even represented parties.
However, the opinion then immediately backs away from that suggestion
by limiting its holding to clients with whom the departing lawyer "either
had significant contact ... or actively represented."5 5 Certainly to the
extent the opinion discusses written communications from a lawyer to
persons not known to or represented by that lawyer, this qualification
comes dangerously close to, if it does not reach, suggesting limits on
lawyer communications to potential clients. Such limits have been
unconstitutional at least since 1988, when the United States Supreme
Court held that written communications, even to unknown nonclients on
virtually any matter, are protected speech so long as they are not false
or deceptive or do not propose an illegal transaction." Thus, as long
as a lawyer does not make "direct personal contact,"57 that lawyer is
free to contact any of the firm's clients, regardless of whether there has
been any previous contact between them.
FAO 98-1 deals with local counsel's responsibilities for the sanctionable discovery abuses of in-house or other out-of-state counsel not
admitted to the State Bar.5" For the most part, this opinion tracks
Standard 71 and acknowledges responsibility when local counsel knows
of and ratifies the other counsel's actions or when one lawyer has direct
supervisory authority over another lawyer and knows of the other
lawyer's abuses. The most important aspect of this opinion is the
disapproval of willful blindness, whereby local counsel, "suspicious that

52. Ga. Sup. Ct., Formal Advisory Op. No. 97-3 (Sept. 4, 1998), available in HANDBOOK
100-H to 101-H.
53. Id.
54. This is an outgrowth of the oft-stated principle that a client always has the right
to fire an attorney for any reason or no reason at all.
55. Formal Advisory Op. No. 97-3, supra note 50.
56. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 473 (1988); see also Florida Bar
v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995) ("Commercial speech... may be regulated
if the government satisfies a test consisting of three related prongs: First, the government
must assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation; second, the government
must demonstrate that the restriction on commercial speech directly and materially
advances that interest; and third, the regulation must be narrowly drawn.") (internal
quotation marks omitted); cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3;
PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3.
57. GA. BAR RULES Rule 4-102(d), Standard 12.
58. Ga. Sup. Ct., Formal Advisory Op. No. 98-1 (June 1, 1998), available in HANDBOOK

101-H.
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lead counsel [is] engaging in or [is] about to engage in a violation of
ethical requirements, [seeks] to avoid acquiring actual knowledge of the
conduct."59 Equating local counsel's avoidance of knowledge with the
other attorney's misconduct for the purpose of culpability, the opinion
states that "a prudent attorney should treat any reasonable suspicion as
sufficient to prompt inquiry."6 °
FAO 98-261 is also rather simple, but it clarifies a substantial
dilemma encountered by many attorneys. The issue it deals with is how
a lawyer should handle unclaimed client funds left in a trust account.
The answer is found in the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, which
provides that abandoned funds may be delivered to the state.62 The
lawyer's responsibility consists of
exhaust[ing] all reasonable efforts to locate the rightful recipient. After
exhausting all reasonable efforts and the expiration of the five year
period discussed in the Act, if the lawyer is still unable to locate the
rightful recipient and the rightful recipient fails to claim the funds, the
funds... are presumed to be abandoned.... and the lawyer may then
deliver the unclaimed funds to the State of Georgia in accordance with
[the Act].6'
FAO 98-3' arose from a long-brewing controversy involving lawyers
who were contacting state prison wardens to complain about the
treatment of inmates who were not their clients.65 After the practice
had gone on for several years, the Georgia Attorney General took the
controversial and somewhat surprising position that such contacts were
prohibited by Standard 47 because they constituted unsolicited legal
advice to the state's client (i.e., the warden) without prior permission
from the state's lawyers. The Court reached the right result, but it may
have been for the wrong reason. According to the opinion, the crucial
questions are (1) whether the government is an adverse party, and (2)
whether the communication is authorized by law, which is an explicit
exception to the prior consent provision of Standard 47. The opinion
concludes that the government is not an adverse party because both the
client's lawyer and the government have the same interest (i.e.,

59. Id.

60. Id.
61.

Ga. Sup. Ct., Formal Advisory Op.No. 98-2 (June 1, 1998), availablein HANDBOOK,

101-H to 102-H.
62.

O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 to -235 (Supp. 1999).

63. Formal Advisory Op. No. 98-2, supra note 59.
64. Ga. Sup. Ct., Formal Advisory Op. No. 98-3 (June 1, 1998), availablein HANDBOOK

102-H.
65.

See AMERIcAN CIviL LIBERTIES UNION

TION/ADvoCAcY DOCKET JAN.-DEC. 1997.

FOUNDATION OF GA.,

INC., LITIGA-
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protecting the inmates); therefore, Standard 47 is not applicable. It also
justifies the communication on First Amendment grounds.
Putting aside the First Amendment concerns, this conclusion cannot
possibly be right. Under the rationale used in the opinion, because the
government's primary purpose is to serve the interests of the people, any
time a client claims that his rights are coextensive with those of the
people (of which he is necessarily one), then his interests and those of
the government are the same, not adverse. Moreover, this rationale
ignores the fact that the state's citizens in prison have different interests
from those not in prison. If nothing else, the state seeks to protect those
on the outside from those on the inside by incarceration. This opinion
could completely, or almost completely, eviscerate the rule in litigation
with the government and therefore set a potentially troubling precedent.
The better, and less dangerous, reason for this conclusion is that this
scenario simply does not fall within Standard 47's description of a
situation in which the government "is represented by a lawyer in that
matter."6 Of course, the government, acting through the warden, is
represented by the state's lawyers, as it always is at some level. More
to the point of the rule's prohibition is that at the time of the communication, there was no existing "matter." The point of Standard 47 is not
to prevent lawyers and other persons from ever speaking, but rather it
is to prevent them from speaking on the issues in a genuine controversy.
The reason for this is that "Standard 47 contemplates a situation where
a party might take advantage of another ... through unauthorized
communication." 7
Here, the scenario indicates that the inmate's
lawyer was merely informing the warden of a problem and possibly
making a demand upon him, which is no different than a situation in
which a lawyer sends a demand letter on an unpaid note or an
automobile accident claim not yet the subject of litigation. Any legal
advice the lawyer may include in one of these communications must be
limited to the suggestion that the recipient obtain counsel. 8 Unless
and until the recipient responds (or refuses to respond) to any communication, it is not clear that there will ever be a real controversy between
the lawyer's client and the recipient of the communication. Thus, such
initial communications should be perfectly permissible.
FAO 98-4 deals with the significance of the descriptive term "of
counsel," 9 and is itself noncontroversial.
However, it does raise

66.
67.
68.
69.

GA. BAR RULES Rule 4-102(d), Standard 47.
Formal Advisory Op. No. 98-3, supra note 64.
GA. BAR RULEs Rule 4-102(d), Standard 48.
Ga. Sup. Ct., Formal Advisory Op. No. 98-4 (Oct. 29, 1998), available in HANDBOOK

102-H to 103-H.
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questions about how much control the supreme court exercises over
FAOs. The opinion twice refers to "the Board" as if the Formal Advisory
Opinion Board issued the opinion. While it is obvious that the Board
initially writes FAOs, the supreme court issues them.
Also, the June 1999 issue of the GeorgiaBar Journalcontains notice
of three proposed FAOs. Proposed FAQ 94-Rll deals with the practices
of in-house counsel for real estate lending institutions and asks whether
conflicts of interest provisions prohibit the lawyer from providing legal
services to the customer regarding the closing and charging a fee for
it.7 ° The opinion concludes that such representation would "constitute
an impermissible conflict of interest under Standards 35 and 36." 7' It
further concludes that while the lender may seek reimbursement for
expenses incurred in the transaction, it may not be denominated or
directly billed to the customer as a legal or attorney fee, largely because
of the risk of confusing the customer about whose interests the lawyer
really represents. 2
The intent of the proposed FAO is obvious, even if its language is not
perfectly clear. Obviously, the drafters are concerned about the degree
to which consumers may be misinformed or misled by the appearance of
the lender's lawyer at a real estate closing. What the customer knows,
of course, is that he is buying real estate and borrowing money from the
lender, pursuant to which he must read and sign numerous papers.
Generally, the papers are largely or totally formulaic, with little or no
negotiation over their contents. These papers are presented at the
closing by the in-house counsel for the lender, and the buyer may or may
not be represented by counsel. In addition, the lender's costs that are
passed on to the customer undoubtedly take into account the legal work
of the attorney, no matter how they are described or named. Under
those circumstances, many customers may conclude that the lender is
providing a lawyer to them as part of the services and that the lawyer
is there to protect their interests, either exclusively or at least in
addition to the lender's interests. The point of the proposed FAO, then,
is to eliminate at least one practice that may lead a borrower to this

70. Proposed Formal Advisory Op.No. 94-R11, available in Notice of Filing of Proposed
Formal Advisory Opinions in Supreme Court, GA. BAR J., June 1999, at 98. If approved
by the supreme court, this would appear to be the first FAO ever to cite the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct as controlling precedent rather than just for comparative
purposes.
71. Id.
72. A less significant aspect of this opinion is its conclusion that, because the in-house
counsel is an employee of the lending institution, the institution's provision of legal services
to its customers would constitute the unauthorized practice of law by a nonlawyer (i.e., the

institution).
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dangerously erroneous conclusion or that may even lead to the unwitting
creation of an attorney-client relationship, which is a danger to both
lawyer and customer. Thus, the lender is prohibited from providing or
describing what it provides as "legal services."
Finally, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board released two proposed
FAOs for comment. Proposed FAO 97-R6 deals with whether a lawyer
who allows a nonlawyer to threaten legal action or provide legal advice
in correspondence signed by the nonlawyer has aided in the unauthorized practice of law.73 The Board proposes to answer this question
affirmatively. Proposed FAO 98-R6 deals with whether a member of a
city council, who is a lawyer and who controls the salary and benefits of
police officers in his official capacity, may represent a criminal defendant
in a case in which the charges are a matter of police discretion.74 The
Board proposes to answer this question affirmatively as well.
IV.

DISCIPLINARY CASES

There are three systems for disciplining lawyers, each with slightly
different emphases, strengths, weaknesses, and levels of effectiveness
and efficiency. Some may view these systems as parallel, each moving
toward the same goal; however, they are actually asymptotically parallel
systems, occasionally meeting and bumping into each other at unpredictable distant points.
Perhaps the most effective system operates through the trial courts,75
which have inherent and rule-based authority to sanction lawyers for
litigation-related behavior. The most common means of disciplining
lawyers are civil or criminal contempt citations or other sanctions
specifically authorized by the rules of procedure.76 This appears to be
the system most likely to deal with big cases or big law firms and their
lawyers. Here, the discipline often comes in the form of monetary
sanctions for litigation-related abuses, and the sanctions are occasionally

73. Proposed Formal Advisory Op. No. 97-R6, availablein FirstPublicationof Proposed
Formal Advisory Opinion No. 97-R6, GA. BAR J., June 1999, at 100.
74. Proposed Formal Advisory Op. No. 98-R6, availablein FirstPublicationof Porposed
Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-R6, GA. BAR J., June 1999, at 103.

75. Actually, the most powerful and pervasive system, the culture in which lawyers live
and work, is nearly invisible, especially to those outside the profession. Some actions a
lawyer could take are shunned simply because of the social disapproval that would
accompany them.
76. The most obvious means of disciplining lawyers in Georgia are sanctions for
discovery abuse under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37(b) (1993), and sanctions for abusive litigation
under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (Supp. 1999).
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quite large.77 Although the courts occasionally refer these matters to
disciplinary authorities, it is almost unheard of for discipline to be
formally pursued or imposed by such bodies.
The second system operates through malpractice suits, which have
become more common in the past ten years or so. These cases also
sometimes focus on big law firms and their lawyers.7 8 Malpractice
suits may be the most visible form of discipline, at least if they are filed
and not settled before filing. The reason is that bar disciplinary
proceedings are conducted largely in private, 79 and only a limited
number of disciplinary sanctions are a matter of public record. 80
Additionally, trial courts may impose the sanctions described above in
unpublished opinions or in opinions in which the lawyers are not named.
It would hardly be surprising if the likelihood of being sued for
malpractice was directly related to the size of the case, the size of the
lawyer's firm, and the presence of malpractice insurance. However,
because malpractice insurance is neither cheap nor mandatory in
Georgia, it may well be that there is a perceptible dividing line between
those lawyers and firms who are likely to be sued for malpractice and
those who are not.
The third system, established by the supreme court and administered
by the State Bar through its State Disciplinary Board and Consumer
Assistance Program,81 was designed for the specific purpose of sanctioning and deterring lawyer misbehavior. However, it may be the least
significant largely because it deals primarily with lawyers who misuse
or steal clients' money or commit crimes, which are surely uncommon
occurrences. This system rarely involves lawyers from large firms or
conduct that arises out of litigation. It is not difficult to make educated
guesses about the reasons for this. Larger firms are more likely than
smaller firms to provide adequate training, supervision, and monitoring
of their lawyers. Also, they are better positioned to settle disputes with
disgruntled clients before those clients report any wrongdoing to the bar.
As for any litigation-related misbehavior by the more accomplished
lawyers in these firms, most disciplinary authorities seem quite
reluctant to get involved in the midst of litigation. Because all courts
have the inherent or rule-based authority discussed above, leaving such
matters to the trial courts may be the best use of limited resources.

77. For an example, see the discussion of the Benlate litigation, infra notes 97-110 and
accompanying text.
78. For an example, see infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
79. See GA. BAR RULES Rules 4-205 to -207.
80. See GA. BAR RULEs Rule 4-221(d).
81. See GA. BAR RULES Rules 4-101, -201.
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Gnann v. Woodall 2 may yet turn out to be one of those rare cases in
which lawyers are disciplined by a court before which they appeared, by
the supreme court, and perhaps by a malpractice suit. Only time will
tell, but it is ironic that the lawyers' actions which are at the center of
this controversy do not clearly violate any particular rule of conduct.
The salient points of this remarkable tale are as follows. Julia Mae
Shiggs entered Savannah's Memorial Medical Center in 1994 to give
birth. Complications developed from a caesarean section, and she
slipped into a coma from which she never recovered. She died on
December 30, 1996.8

Shiggs's common-law husband, Michael Mydell, was appointed
guardian of her person and property in October 1994. Prior to Shiggs's
death, Mydell hired David Roberson, a Savannah lawyer and minister,
to sue for malpractice and loss of consortium. Roberson and Mydell
agreed on a fifty percent contingency fee, and Roberson retained John
Woodall to help him litigate the case. 4 The case went to trial, albeit
without Mydell's loss of consortium claim. The parties settled after
several days, with defendants agreeing to pay $3.325 million in cash and
to provide Shiggs with continuing medical care.8 5
Defendants paid the cash settlement to Roberson and Woodall almost
immediately. A disbursement statement indicated that the lawyers kept
$102,295.24 to pay for their expenses and that they paid $151,359.33 to
Mydell, apparently in his individual capacity despite the fact that his
loss of consortium claim had been dismissed. More significantly,
Roberson received $1.3 million and Woodall received $1.1 million, which
accounted for more than seventy percent of the $3.325 million cash
payment from defendants. The lawyers based their calculation of their
fifty percent contingency fee, not on the $3.325 million cash payment,
but rather on the cash plus the $1.425 million projected value of the
medical
care defendants agreed to provide Shiggs for the rest of her
6
life.

82. 270 Ga. 516, 511 S.E.2d 188 (1999), rev'g In re Woodall, 231 Ga. App. 391, 499
S.E.2d 150 (1998).
83. 231 Ga. App. at 391, 499 S.E.2d at 151-52.
84. As a result of this arrangement, Woodall argued that he was an independent
contractor and that he had no direct relationship with Mydell or Shiggs's estate, thus
relieving him of any direct responsibility to them. The court of appeals rejected this
argument because an "attorney cannot avoid legal or ethical considerations by asserting
an independent contractor defense." Id. at 396, 499 S.E.2d at 155.
85. Id. at 391-92, 499 S.E.2d at 152.
86. Id. at 392-93, 499 S.E.2d at 152-53. As the court of appeals noted, Roberson and
Woodall apparently miscalculated their fees because the amount they took was more than
fifty percent of the sum of the cash payment and the valuation of future medical care for
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However, there were three problems with this calculation. First, the
extra value of the medical care did not actually exist. The hospital
agreed to provide medical care for Shiggs, regardless of the cost, but no
money was actually being paid to anyone.8 7 Second, Roberson and
Woodall based their valuation of future medical care for Shiggs on the
assumption that she would live at least seven more years."' This
assumption seems, at least in hindsight, to be grossly at odds with the
likely prospects for Shiggs's continued survival.8 9 Finally, because
Shiggs died before the year ended, the total value of the medical care she
received was considerably less than the $1.425 million valuation.
When this information became public, Probate Court Judge Lewis
became concerned and ordered Roberson and Woodall to pay the money
into the state court registry until the matter was reviewed. After they
failed to comply with this order, Judge Lewis held them in contempt.
They claimed that the probate court had no jurisdiction to order them to
repay their fees and that, in any event, they had done nothing improper.
The court of appeals held that the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction,
Woodall eventually repaid
but the supreme court reversed."

Shiggs. Id. at 392, 499 S.E.2d at 152. In addition, the future medical care for Shiggs
appeared to have been overvalued. Id. at 393, 499 S.E.2d at 152-53. The controversy
surrounding the manner in which Roberson and Woodall calculated their fees culminated
in at least one lawsuit regarding the medical care to which Shiggs was entitled under the
agreement. Id. at 394 & n.4, 499 S.E.2d at 153 & n.4.
87. Id. at 393, 499 S.E.2d at 153.
88. Ann Woolner, In Crossing Vulnerable Client, Lawyer Still Misses Bar's Point,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Apr. 26, 1999, at 1.

89. Id.
90. 270 Ga. at 516, 511 S.E.2d at 188-89. This chain of events caused more lawsuits
to ensue. For example, Shiggs's estate moved to intervene in an unrelated wrongful death
case in which Roberson was involved and petitioned the judge to order Robinson to pay
part of his fees from that case to satisfy his debt to Shiggs's estate. Terry Dickson, Jury

Awards Family$5M in FatalCrash, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville), Apr. 25, 1997, at B1.
Also, the administrator of Shiggs's estate sued Roberson for malpractice, and when

Roberson failed to respond timely, the trial court entered a default judgment against him.
Roberson v. Gnann, 235 Ga. App. 112, 113, 508 S.E.2d 480, 481 (1998). The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of default judgment. Id.
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$677,000.91 Roberson, who later admitted that his fee was too large,92
eventually filed for bankruptcy.93
This case provided at least three interesting, if not precedential,
developments that are related to legal ethics. First, the court of appeals
found that Woodall had obligations to Shiggs even though he never had
a direct relationship with her and even though he claimed to be an
independent contractor.94 This is a clear signal that lawyers who
merely act as consultants might face significant liability for malpractice
or improper behavior. Second, the State Bar brought disciplinary
proceedings against both lawyers.95 Finally, the Bar took the apparently unprecedented position of seeking disgorgement of Roberson's and

Woodall's fees.

6

91. Lawrence Viele, Shiggs Lawyers Slapped Anew; ContemptFindingRestored; State
Supreme Court Says PairCan Be Cited for Refusal to Return Fee, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., Jan. 20, 1999, at 1. Woodall repaid a portion of this money in settlement of the
malpractice claim brought against him by Shiggs's estate. Ben Schmitt, Verdict Out in
Case Against Savannah's 'Siamese Twins,' FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Apr. 28, 1999, at
1.
92. Woolner, supra note 88. In addition, Roberson now acknowledges that he and
Woodall overvalued the future medical care. Trisha Renaud, Checks Flew, but Not to
Client; Savannah Lawyers Fight Order to Post Fees with Court, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., Jan. 24, 1997, at 1.
93. SunTrust Bank v. Roberson (In re Roberson), 231 B.R. 136 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1999).
Bankruptcy Judge Walker ordered Roberson to pay $450,000 to Shiggs's estate in
settlement of the malpractice action it brought against him. Schmitt, supra note 91.
94. 231 Ga. App. at 396, 499 S.E.2d at 155. Although the supreme court reversed the
court of appeals decision, it did not disturb this portion of the court of appeals opinion.
95. The disciplinary hearing focused on whether Roberson and Woodall charged an
excessive fee in violation of Standard 31(a) and whether they committed fraud by
submitting a false affidavit to support their valuation of the future medical care in
violation of Standard 4. Schmitt, supra note 91. Other Standards of Conduct they were
charged with violating include Standard 30 (prohibiting lawyers from accepting
employment if their judgment might be affected by personal interests), Standard 31(d)(2)
(requiring a written accounting of the distribution of money recovered in a contingent fee
representation), Standard 36 (prohibiting representation of multiple clients with conflicting
interests), Standard 44 (prohibiting lawyers from abandoning or wilfully disregarding a
matter without just cause), Standard 61 (requiring prompt notification to a client of the
receipt of funds belonging to the client and prompt delivery to the client of the funds),
Standard 63 (requiring maintenance of complete records of a client's funds and a prompt
accounting to the client of the funds), and Standard 65(a) (prohibiting the commingling of
a client's funds with the lawyer's funds and requiring an accounting of funds held in trust).
Trisha Renaud, Bar Goes After Savannah Duo's Fee and Maybe Their Licenses, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan. 5, 1998, at 1.
96. Renaud, supra note 95.
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A.

The Trial Courts
During the survey period, one federal district court in Georgia
delivered a stinging indictment of lawyers' behavior that resulted in a
windfall to the state's law schools. In re E.1 DuPont de Nemours &
Co. 7 arose from claims by fourteen nurserymen that DuPont's fungicide Benlate contaminated their plants and soils. 98 While these claims
were being litigated, it became clear to Judge Robert Elliott that
DuPont's lawyers failed to produce adverse findings about their client's
product during discovery."9 In an order detailing his findings from no
fewer than five hearings, Judge Elliott found the lawyers' and DuPont's
behavior to be flagrant and deliberate.0 0 He also found that they
engaged in a "deliberate effort ... to impede, delay, and otherwise
restrict legitimate discovery,"' that they engaged in "a scheme ... of
hiding and concealing ... critical and pivotal evidence,"0 2 and that

they "falsely present[edl the results and conclusions of [certain] tests
through a[n unqualified] witness."' In sum, Judge Elliott found that
they "made [the] trial ... a farce."" ° As punishment for this conduct,
Judge Elliott imposed various sanctions on DuPont, including a
monetary sanction of over $13 million for abusing discovery and wasting
judicial resources and a monetary sanction of $100 million for civil
contempt. 05 DuPont appealed the contempt order, and the circuit
court reversed that aspect of Judge Elliott's order because it was
"overwhelmingly punitive-and thus criminal-in nature" and because
it was imposed without "the procedural protections the Constitution
requires for the imposition of criminal contempt sanctions."'
On remand Judge Hugh Lawson ordered the matter to "go forward as
a criminal contempt proceeding."0 7 However, the matter was eventually resolved by a consent order that was probably unique in American

97. 918 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Ga. 1995).

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1528.
Id. at 1529.
Id. at 1530.
Id. at 1533.
Id. at 1535.
Id.
Id. at 1556.
Id. at 1557.
In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 99 F.3d 363, 368 (11th Cir. 1996).
In re E.I DuPont de Nemours &Co., No. 4:95-CV-36(HL) (M.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 1998)

(unpublished Order). Judge Lawson also requested that the United States Attorney for the
Middle District of Georgia investigate and prosecute the abuses that occurred. Id.
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legal history.' 8 DuPont agreed to a fine of $11 million, $10 million of
which was to be distributed equally to Georgia's four accredited law
schools to establish chairs in professionalism and ethics, and $1 million
of which was to be used to endow an annual symposium on professionalism and ethics.' 9 Acknowledging "a fundamental misunderstanding
of the intent of the Court's discovery requirements . . . and that such
misunderstanding provided sufficient grounds for the investigation by
the court," Alston & Bird agreed to pay $250,000 to the Chief Justice's
Commission on Professionalism."0 As of this writing, the Commission's and law schools' plans are not complete, but it seems safe to
predict that the combination of Georgia's pioneering efforts in professionalism and this windfall for the schools could make our state the focal
point of significant ethics writing, research and teaching for years to
come.
B.

Legal MalpracticeActions

1. Substantive Elements. In Hunter,Maclean, Exley & Dunn, PC.
v. Frame,"' Mr. and Mrs. Frame were represented by their long-time
attorneys at Hunter Maclean in selling their business to Golden Isles
Petroleum. Apparently, the firm made several substantial errors at the
April 1989 closing. Fifteen months later,"2 Golden Isles sued the
Frames for securities fraud and breach of contract, alleging that they
failed to reveal several material items at the closing. Maintaining that
it had not exposed the Frames to liability, Hunter Maclean withdrew
from representation of the Frames in that case only because it was likely
to be a witness in the case. Despite the firm's assurances, the Frames
were found liable for damages of $585,000, and the judgment was
affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit." 3
The Frames did not immediately sue Hunter Maclean for malpractice
because a tolling agreement gave them until April 24, 1994, to file. They
did not file until September 26, 1994, which was still five months late.

108. In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 4:95-CV-36(HL) (M.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1998)
(unpublished Consent Order and Final Judgment).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 269 Ga. 844, 507 S.E.2d 411 (1998).
112. There is some ambiguity on this point. At the beginning of the opinion, the court
stated that the closing occurred in April 1989 and that Golden Isles filed suit in federal
court in July 1989. Id. at 845, 507 S.E.2d at 412. Later in the opinion, the court stated
that Golden Isles filed the federal action fifteen months after the closing, which is
apparently the accurate date. Id. at 850, 507 S.E.2d at 415.
113. Id. at 845, 850, 507 S.E.2d at 412, 415-16.
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In response, Hunter Maclean moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the statute of limitations had passed. The court of appeals
Hunter
held that the continuing confidential relationship between
14
Maclean and the Frames tolled the statute of limitations.
The supreme court reversed, finding that the firm did not intentionally
mislead the Frames or deter them from filing suit within the statutory
time period."" The court's reasoning was quite logical. All plaintiffs,
even those who allege fraud, have a duty to discover the harm done to
them and to act within a reasonable time to redress it."16 Plaintiffs
the exercise of
who charge fraud have until they discover, or through
117
ordinary care, should have discovered the fraud.
That requirement [using ordinary care to discover fraud] certainly is
not eliminated merely because the underlying action does not sound in
fraud, but rather in professional negligence .... It follows that the
existence between the parties of a confidential relationship is not a
separate and independent basis for tolling, but rather it is an
important factor affecting the duty to disclose and the duty of ordinary
diligence to be considered in the fraud analysis itself.
•.. A confidential relationship between the parties imposes a greater
duty on a defendant to reveal what should be revealed, and a lessened
duty on the part of the plaintiffto discover what should be discoverable
through the exercise of ordinary care.'
That principle having been established, the result was easy to reach, or
so it would seem from the opinion. After all, Mr. Frame admitted that
no Hunter Maclean lawyer had in any way misled the Frames about the
facts." 9' Because "the Frames knew about most of the errors within
six months of the closing[, they] could not have been deterred from
bringing suit as early as October 1988. "12o

114. Id. at 845-46, 507 S.E.2d at 412-13. The court of appeals reasoned that the firm
continued to represent the Frames in other matters and continued to advise them that they
were not exposed to liability in the Golden Isles lawsuit. Id. at 846, 507 S.E.2d at 413.
115. Id. at 850-51, 507 S.E.2d at 416. In fact, the opinion places very little emphasis
on the second element, deterrence from filing. Nevertheless, the court noted, "[W]here the
gravamen of the underlying action is not a claim of fraud, but rather of malpractice, the
statute of limitations is tolled only upon a showing of'a separate independent actual fraud
involving moral turpitude which ...deters [a] plaintiff from [filing suit].'" Id. at 847, 507
S.E.2d at 413 (quoting Shipman v. Horizon Corp., 245 Ga. 808, 809, 267 S.E.2d 244, 246
(1980)) (alterations by court).
116. Id. at 848, 507 S.E.2d at 414.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 848, 849, 507 S.E.2d at 414 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
119. Id. at 850, 507 S.E.2d at 415.
120. Id. at 851, 507 S.E.2d at 416.
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In rejecting the rationale of the court of appeals, the supreme court
held that the existence of a confidential relationship does not toll the
statute of limitations by negating the requirement of showing intentional
concealment and actual deterrence.'21
The court explained that
"[blecause the existence of a confidential relationship between the
parties, such as existed here, does not affect the existence of fraud-that
is, the intention to conceal or deceive-a confidential relationship cannot,
standing alone, toll the running of the statute."'22 Instead, a confidential relationship merely entitles a client to rely on, and place faith in, a
lawyer."2 Thus, the existence of a confidential relationship affects the
extent of the client's duty to discover the fraud and the lawyer's duty to
reveal the fraud, but it does not relieve the client of proving the fraud
itself or the deterrence.'24 The court, therefore, overruled the portion
of Sutlive v. Hackney2 that negated the requirement of showing fraud
in tolling situations when a confidential relationship exists.'26
Dow Chemical Co. v. Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart'2 7
raised a question that has been litigated many times-what elements
must a plaintiff prove to make out a prima facie case of attorney
malpractice? The answer in Georgia is clear. A plaintiff must show
employment of the lawyer, the lawyer's failure to exercise ordinary care,
and damages proximately caused by the lawyer's negligence. 2 ' While
the first two elements are difficult enough to prove, it is often most
difficult to prove causative damages, especially when the malpractice is
failure to prosecute an appeal properly. Dow Chemical Co. involved just
such a failure.
In the case underlying this malpractice action, a jury found Dow
Chemical Co. liable for damages after it determined that toxins from one
of Dow's unlined coagulation ponds seeped into plaintiff's soil and
groundwater. After the trial court entered judgment on the verdict, it
granted Dow's motion for an extension of time for filing post-trial
motions. Dow then filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and when the trial court denied the motion, Dow appealed. The
Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court was
not authorized to extend the time for filing posttrial motions and that,

121. Id. at 847, 507 S.E.2d at 414.
122. Id.

123. Id. at 848, 507 S.E.2d at 414.
124. Id.
125.
126.

164 Ga. App. 740, 741-42, 297 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1982).
269 Ga. at 849, 507 S.E.2d at 415.

127. 237 Ga. App. 27, 514 S.E.2d 836 (1999).
128. See, e.g., Huntington v. Fishman, 212 Ga. App. 27, 29, 441 S.E.2d 444, 446.

374

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

therefore, Dow's motion was not timely.129 Dow then sued its attorneys for malpractice.
Dow argued that it was damaged by losing the ability to appeal, which
also caused it to lose some negotiation leverage. Essentially, Dow asked
the court to relax the standard for proving a malpractice claim by
adopting a lost opportunity standard, under which a plaintiff could prove
the damages element by showing that the lawyer caused the plaintiff to
lose the opportunity to appeal. The theory behind this standard is that
merely filing an appeal may induce a settlement and that the failure to
appeal deprives the appellant of this opportunity.3 0 However, the
court found that "it is highly questionable whether such speculative
" 1 1
damages can properly serve as the basis for a malpractice action.
The Court may well be right that lost opportunity damages are too
speculative to sustain a malpractice claim. Nevertheless, the court of
appeals allowed just that at least once before, in Freeman v. Pittman,132 which the court did not cite in Dow Chemical Co. What makes
the court's failure to address Freeman more unsettling is that the same
panel of judges participated in both cases. Judge Ruffin wrote the
court's opinion in both cases, and Judges Pope and Beasley concurred.
In fairness, it should be pointed out that Freeman is not precisely on
point. In Freeman the lawyer represented a client with multiple
mortgages on her home. After negotiating with one of the lienholders,
he incorrectly believed and informed his client that the property was
otherwise unencumbered. When one of the remaining lienholders later
initiated foreclosure proceedings, Freeman had to pay a high price to
keep the property. She sued Pittman for malpractice, arguing what Dow
argued-that her lawyer's negligence deprived her of an "opportunity."
In other words, her negotiating position had been substantially
weakened by the attorney's actions.' 3 It is possible to distinguish
Dow Chemical Co. and Freeman on the ground that the award in Dow
Chemical Co. included $2 million in punitive damages, an inherently
subjective (i.e., "speculative") amount, while the amounts of the liens in
Freeman were determinate. However, there are two problems with that
distinction. First, the court in Freeman made it clear that it understood
how the different lienholders' relative negotiating positions were hurt or
helped merely by their position in line, recognizing that the amount any

129. 237 Ga. App. at 28, 514 S.E.2d at 838-39; see also Pinion v. Dow Chem., U.S.A.,
928 F.2d 1522, 1524 (11th Cir. 1991).
130. 237 Ga. App. at 29-30, 514 S.E.2d at 839.
131. Id. at 30, 514 S.E.2d at 839.
132. 220 Ga. App. 672, 469 S.E.2d 543 (1996).
133. Id. at 672-73, 469 S.E.2d at 544-45.
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one of them could expect to recover was not solely a function of

calculating the amount due under the promissory note." 4 Second, the
court in Freemannoted that "the rule against the recovery of speculative
damages relates primarily to speculation regarding proximate cause
rather than extent. Once a plaintiff establishes that damages proximately flow from the defendant's alleged conduct, 'mere difficulty in
fixing their exact amount' should not be a legal obstacle to recovery."'35
Thus, it seems that the real problem the court had in Dow Chemical Co.
was one that it overlooked in Freeman. Just what makes these cases so
different on this count is really not clear.
2. Malpractice Affidavits. The Georgia Civil Practice Act requires
all complaints alleging professional malpractice to be accompanied by an
affidavit of an expert that specifies the negligence that is the subject of
the complaint. 3 6 While the majority of cases construing this requirement are medical malpractice suits, the requirements are the same for
lawyers. The significant cases decided by the appellate courts during
the survey period answered such weighty questions as (1) whether an
affidavit is valid if the notary does not formally swear the witness; (2)
whether an affiant's swearing to the correctness of an affidavit via a long
distance telephone call complies with the statute; (3) whether an
affiant's inability to confirm the facts of the affidavit at a later
deposition effectively voids the affidavit; and (4) whether one can file an
amendment to an affidavit that was not originally signed before a
notary.
In Harris v. Murray,13' defendant challenged plaintiff's expert
affidavit because the affiant admitted at a deposition that the notary
failed to administer an oath before he signed the affidavit. The trial
court granted summary judgment for defendant because an affidavit not
accompanied by an oath is not an affidavit under O.C.G.A. section 9-119.1.138
Judge Pope wrote for the majority and reversed the trial
court.'39 The court held that the affidavit was valid because "although
the affiant did not hold up his hand and swear before signing the
affidavit, both he and the notary public understood that his actions and
signing of the affidavit in the notary public's presence were all that was

134. Id. at 674, 469 S.E.2d at 545.
135. Id. (quoting Georgia Ports Auth. v. Servac Int'l, 202 Ga. App. 777, 780,415 S.E.2d
516, 519 (1992)) (citation omitted).
136. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a) (Supp. 1999). There is, of course, an exception to this

general
137.
138.
139.

rule. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(b) (Supp. 1999).
233 Ga. App. 661, 504 S.E.2d 736 (1998).
Id. at 661, 504 S.E.2d at 738.
Id. at 667, 504 S.E.2d at 741.
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necessary to complete the act of swearing."" 4 The court thus rejected
the notion that affidavits must conform with strict formalities to be
valid.' Chief Judge Andrews dissented, arguing that the affidavit did
not comply with the statute's requirements.'
He further contended
that the statute requires a formal oath and that the evidence did not
support the majority's informal oath theory.'
The court of appeals decision in Harrisis difficult to square with the
supreme court's holding in Sambor v. Kelley.'" In Sambor the expert
signed the affidavit in Michigan after a notary in Georgia administered
the oath during a telephone conversation. The trial court granted
summary judgment for defendant because the expert did not sign the
affidavit in the notary's physical presence.' 45 The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's interpretation of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1,
holding that "notarization occurs only when the affiant or person
acknowledging execution personally appears before the notary.""
Frankly, it is not obvious why the Sambor principle should be the rule.
Assuming that the notary takes the necessary steps to ensure that the
caller is who the caller purports to be and that the caller and the notary
are looking at the same affidavit, it is not obvious why physical
proximity is required. Surely it is not because the notary is unable
accurately to gauge the affiant's sincerity; determining the verity of the
affidavit is not the notary's job. Why one's presence in this context
should not encompass contemporaneous discussion over an instrument
as reliable as a telephone is not obvious either. Would an affidavit
notarized by a blind notary be invalid merely because the notary could

140. Id. at 665, 504 S.E.2d at 740.
141. Id. at 664-65, 504 S.E.2d at 740 (citing Carnes v. Carnes, 138 Ga. 1, 6, 74 S.E.
785, 788 (1912); Britt v. Davis, 130 Ga. 74, 77, 60 S.E. 180, 180-81 (1908); McCain v.

Bonner, 122 Ga. 842, 846, 51 S.E. 36, 38 (1905)).
142. Id. at 669, 504 S.E.2d at 743 (Andrews, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Andrews
dissents quite often in these cases, usually arguing that the court has not applied the
statute as written. See, e.g., Sinkfield v. Oh, 229 Ga. App. 883, 495 S.E.2d 94 (1997); S K
Hand Tool Corp. v. Lowman, 223 Ga. App. 712, 479 S.E.2d 103 (1996); Velez v. Bethune,
219 Ga. App. 679, 466 S.E.2d 627 (1995); Works v. Aupont, 219 Ga. App. 577, 465 S.E.2d
717 (1995); Howard v. City of Columbus, 219 Ga. App. 569, 466 S.E.2d 51 (1995); Sisk v.
Patel, 217 Ga. App. 156, 456 S.E.2d 718 (1995); Salmon v. Pearson & Assocs., 214 Ga. App.
11, 446 S.E.2d 762 (1994); Thurman v. Pruitt Corp., 212 Ga. App. 766, 442 S.E.2d 849
(1994); Smith v. North Fulton Med. Ctr., 200 Ga. App. 464, 408 S.E.2d 468 (1991). It is
rare for Chief Judge Andrews to find an affidavit sufficient to meet the statute's
requirements, but it happens occasionally. See, e.g., Chandler v. Koenig, 203 Ga. App. 684,
417 S.E.2d 715 (1992).
143. 233 Ga. App. at 669-73, 504 S.E.2d at 743-46 (Andrews, C.J., dissenting).
144. 271 Ga. 133, 518 S.E.2d 120 (1999).
145. Id. at 133, 518 S.E.2d at 121.
146. Id. at 134, 518 S.E.2d at 121.
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not see and identify the person before him? If the point of physical
proximity is not gauging sincerity, then what is it? It seems that the
only way to execute a valid affidavit is to administer the oath formally
in a ceremony accompanying the signing of the affidavit, which is the
very thing that the court of appeals in Harrisdid not demand. This does
not bode well for Harris as precedent.
In Sawyer v. DeKalb Medical Center, Inc., 4 ' defendant deposed
plaintiff's expert, whose affidavit plaintiff attached to the complaint as
required by O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1, one year after plaintiff filed the
action. At the deposition, the expert was unable to confirm the negligent
acts described in the affidavit. Plaintiff then dismissed the complaint
but refiled it six months later with an affidavit from another expert.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the first
expert's deposition testimony vitiated his affidavit, which then voided
plaintiff's action, and that a voided action could not be renewed. Thus,
defendant argued that because the statute of limitations expired before
plaintiff refiled, summary judgment was required. The trial court
agreed with defendant and granted summary judgment. " 8
The court of appeals reversed, holding that defendant was not entitled
to summary judgment because it failed to argue in its initial responsive
pleading in the first action that the affidavit was improper."' The
court further explained that even if defendant had done so, summary
judgment still would have been inappropriate because "[tihe question is
whether the affidavit as filed is sufficient under OCGA § 9-11-9.1, not
whether the affiant will repeat that testimony a year later in a
deposition."15 ° The court reasoned that "[tihe validity of an affidavit
for OCGA § 9-11-9.1 purposes is not a summary judgment question; it
is a motion to dismiss question;" thus, the statute imposes only an initial
pleading requirement, not an evidentiary requirement.'
In Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital v. Skipper,' the court of
appeals reconsidered its earlier decision in the same case that an
affidavit was invalid under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 because the affiant
did not sign the affidavit in the notary's presence and that a second
affidavit did not supplement the pleading. 5 ' First, the court noted
that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 should be liberally construed to allow "a

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

234 Ga. App. 54, 506 S.E.2d 197 (1998).
Id. at 54, 506 S.E.2d at 198.
Id. at 55-56, 506 S.E.2d at 200-01.
Id. at 58, 506 S.E.2d at 201.
Id. at 57, 506 S.E.2d at 200.
235 Ga. App. 534, 510 S.E.2d 101 (1998).
Id. at 534, 510 S.E.2d at 102.
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plaintiff [to] amend an affidavit when its sufficiency or the expert's
competency is challenged," provided that the statute's purpose of
reducing frivolous malpractice actions is not frustrated."5 Because
plaintiff's original affidavit was facially valid, it was only voidable, not
void.' 55 Although defendant showed that plaintiff's original affidavit
was defective, plaintiff cured the defect by substituting a valid affidavit
for the defective one prior to the trial court's ruling on defendant's
motion to dismiss. 56 Accordingly, the trial court properly denied

defendant's motion to dismiss.'5 7 Judge Smith, joined by Chief Judge
Andrews, dissented, arguing that the original affidavit could not be
cured because it "was not
an affidavit at all; [plaintiff] in essence filed
158
no affidavit to amend."
As shown by these cases, the law of malpractice affidavits presents
apparently conflicting and inconsistent results. It is very easy and
usually inexpensive to obtain a malpractice affidavit. Nevertheless, the
statute wastes more time and paper than it is worth because it causes
lawyers, clients, and the judicial system to expend huge amounts of
resources that could be better spent elsewhere.'5 9
C.

The DisciplinarySystem

As for grievance forms filed by complainants,"6 it is interesting to
note that the number filed has remained relatively stable in the past

154. Id. at 535, 510 S.E.2d at 103 (citing Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 651,492
S.E.2d 665, 667 (1997); Harris v. Murray, 233 Ga. App. 661, 666, 504 S.E.2d 736, 741
(1998)).

155. Id.
156. Id. at 535-36, 510 S.E.2d at 103-04.
157. Id. at 537, 510 S.E.2d at 104.
158. Id. at 538, 510 S.E.2d at 105 (Smith, J., dissenting). Judge Smith argued that the
affidavit "was wholly invalid, because the notary was not present when [the affiant] signed
it." Id. at 537, 510 S.E.2d at 105.
159. See Roy M. Sobelson, Legal Ethics, 48 MERCER L. REV. 387, 402-07 (1996); Roy M.
Sobelson, Legal Ethics, 45 MERCER L. REV. 287, 311-12 (1993); Roy M. Sobelson, Legal
Ethics, 44 MERCER L. REV. 281, 293-96 (1992).
160. The prosecution of grievances is a rather selective, as well as lengthy process, and
often does little to satisfy consumers' real needs. In recent years, the State Bar has taken
some creative steps to better meet consumers' needs and to educate lawyers. One example
is the Overdraft Notification Program, under which the Bar receives notices from banks
that have returned lawyers' trust account checks for insufficient funds. While many
worried that this would subject dozens of lawyers to draconian disciplinary measures, the
numbers do not bear out that fear. For example, during the State Bar's 1998-1999
operational year, the Bar received 311 notices of overdrafts. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL
COUNSEL, STATE BAR OF GA., REPORT OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE 15 (1999). Of

those, 194 were dismissed, 11 were referred to Law Practice Management, and only 19
were referred to the Investigative Panel. Id.
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several years..' despite the creation of the Consumer Assistance
Program." 2 This could mean a number of things-it could mean that
complaints from clients are rising overall, but are being winnowed out
of the system by the program, or it could mean that the number of
complaints is unaffected by the program's existence. Of course, it is also
possible that there is no statistical relationship between the number of
matters that are informally settled by the program (which was designed
to deal with minor violations of disciplinary standards) and the number
of formal complaints of a disciplinary nature. Perhaps further study will
make this more clear. As for public discipline imposed by the supreme
court between May 1, 1998, and April 30, 1999, there were twenty-seven
disbarments, forty-five suspensions, seven public reprimands, four
Review Panel reprimands, and three letters of admonition,"6 totals4
which are not that different from the statistics in most recent years.'
Most of these cases do not raise novel questions or make new law, but
at least two are worthy of special attention.
In re Freeman16 was one of the few cases in which a lawyer who
admitted to taking money from his clients' trust accounts was not
disbarred, although Justice Hunstein argued in dissent that disbarment
was the only appropriate sanction.'6
This case arose when Freeman mishandled funds in two estate
accounts. From one account, Freeman wrote two checks for cash totaling
$935.13 and then loaned the money to his brother. Freeman falsified the
check register to hide his misconduct. On two other occasions, Freeman
wrote checks for $1000 and $3800.91 from another account and failed to
record these withdrawals in the check register. When Freeman's partner
noticed that something was amiss, Freeman immediately did three
things, all of which are unfortunately rare in this kind of disciplinary
case. First, he immediately confessed to his partner and to the probate
court. Second, he made full restitution to the concerned parties.

161. There were 2093 in 1998-1999 and 1971 in 1997-1998. REPORT OF THE GENERAL
COUNSEL'S OFFICE, supra note 160, at 4. There were 2109 in 1996-1997. OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL, STATE BAR OF GA., REPORT OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE 4
(1998). There were 2180 in 1995-1996 and 2335 in 1994-1995. Roy M. Sobelson, Legal
Ethics, 48 MERCER L. REV. 387, 389 n.13 (1996). There were 2385 in 1992-1993. Roy M.
Sobelson, Legal Ethics, 45 MERCER L. REV. 287, 295 (1993).
162. GA. BAR RULES Rules 12-101 to -109.
163. REPORT OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE, supra note 160, at 8-9.
164. See Roy M. Sobelson, Legal Ethics, 48 MERCER L. REV. 387, 395 (1996); Roy M.
Sobelson, Legal Ethics, 45 MERCER L. REV, 287, 295 (1993).
165. 269 Ga. 906, 506 S.E.2d 872 (1998) (per curiam).
166. Id. at 909 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
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Finally, he reported his misdeeds to the State Bar.167 Nevertheless,
Bar counsel sought disbarment. Making special note of these three facts
and the testimony of Freeman's psychiatrist, psychologist, and several
character witnesses, the supreme court ordered a ninety-day suspension
and a minimum of one year of continued psychotherapy.'
Justice Hunstein dissented because Freeman "engaged in professional
conduct involving dishonesty ... [and] there were no persuasive
mitigating circumstances."6 9 While Justice Hunstein may be right
that Freeman's conduct warranted disbarment, her argument is not
entirely convincing because the cases she cited for support seem to be
very different from Freeman's case. 7 °
There are some powerful lessons to be drawn from this case. First,
this case puts to rest the notion that a lawyer's trust account indiscretions will inevitably lead to disbarment. Second, it makes a good case
for doing the right thing even after committing improprieties. The fact
that Freeman admitted his misconduct to his partner and to the Bar,
paid the money back, and sought professional help should not go
unnoticed or unrecognized by all members of the Bar.
In re Zaleon 7 ' was the supreme court's second opinion in the
disciplinary case against Ruth Zaleon. 72 The case presented the court
with an opportunity both to educate the public and bar and to expressly
disapprove of specific unethical conduct, but the court did not take
advantage of either opportunity. Instead, many lawyers are left
scratching their heads and wondering how to avoid the same fate as
Zaleon.' 7 3

167. 269 Ga. at 906-07, 506 S.E.2d at 872.
168. Id. at 907-09, 506 S.E.2d at 872.
169. Id. at 909, 506 S.E.2d at 874 (Hunstein, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice
Hunstein previously acknowledged that an attorney convicted of a felony should not
necessarily be disbarred if there are mitigating circumstances. See In re Washburn, 266
Ga. 50, 53, 464 S.E.2d 192, 194 (1995) (Hunstein, J., dissenting) (citing In re Patteson, 262
Ga. 591, 423 S.E.2d 248 (1992) (unlawful possession of controlled substance); In re Stubbs,
259 Ga. 283, 380 S.E.2d 462 (1989) (willful failure to file income tax return); In re Roberts,
259 Ga. 267,380 S.E.2d 51 (1989) (submitting false information to the federal government);
In re Hege, 258 Ga. 492, 371 S.E.2d 403 (1988) (willful failure to file income tax return)).
170. See In re Carlson, 268 Ga. 335, 489 S.E.2d 834 (1997) (involving a lawyer's failure
to pay child support, which removes the lawyer from good standing under Georgia Bar Rule
1-209); In re Washburn, 266 Ga. 50, 464 S.E.2d 192 (1995) (involving a lawyer who pleaded
guilty to criminal fraud and an abundance of aggravating factors).
171. 269 Ga. 835, 504 S.E.2d 702 (1998).
172. In its first opinion involving Zaleon, the court remanded the action to the
Investigative Panel for further proceedings because the court held that a public reprimand
was an inadequate sanction. In re Zaleon, 268 Ga. 900, 900, 494 S.E.2d 669, 670 (1998).
173. Unfortunately, the court often fails to include enough names, places, facts, and
reasons in its disciplinary opinions.
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Zaleon was a real estate lawyer who represented lenders in a large
number of residential closings. For these closings, Zaleon filed
settlement statements, which detailed the recording fees for each closing.
Over the years, Zaleon's firm developed the practice of collecting fees
that were usually larger than the fees actually paid, partly because she
sometimes had to pay additional fees associated with re-recording
documents. The firm collected these fees and deposited them in
recording accounts, from which the fees would be paid. When the
amount collected from a client exceeded the amount paid on that client's
behalf, Zaleon either left the excess in the recording account or used it
to pay for unrelated expenses. Zaleon did not refund any excesses to her
clients. In the transaction that gave rise to the grievance against
Zaleon, Zaleon refused a client's request to refund any overage and
transferred money from the firm's recording account to its operating
account. 74 After balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the
court suspended Zaleon for six months and ordered her to make
restitution to her clients. 175
However, the court provided no guidance to lawyers because it failed
to cite the Standards Zaleon violated in either of its opinions. Furthermore, the court failed to clarify which of Zaleon's acts was the basis for
the discipline it imposed. This virtually eliminates any chance that
lawyers will appreciate the precise point of the case and the ostensible
error of Zaleon's ways.
V. REMOVAL OF JUDGES
In addition to the three disciplinary system discussed in Part IV, there
is a fourth disciplinary system that is reserved for lawyers who are also
judicial officers. While removal of judicial officers is rare, it does
happen, and one case decided by the supreme court during the survey
period was unique, to say the least. In In re Inquiry Concerning a
Judge,'76 the court permanently barred Judge Maylon London from
holding any judicial office in Georgia. 177 As a result of a consent
agreement with the Judicial Qualifications Commissions, London had
already resigned his positions as Chief Magistrate of White County and
Municipal Court Judge of Cleveland, Georgia.'78 Much like the court's
opinion in In re Zaleon, its opinion in London's case does not make clear
exactly what London did. The attachment to the court's opinion alludes

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

269 Ga. at 836-37, 504 S.E.2d at 702-03.
Id. at 837, 504 S.E.2d at 703.
270 Ga. 1, 508 S.E.2d 383 (1998).
Id. at 1, 508 S.E.2d at 383.
Id.
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to both a personal impropriety and official improprieties. 179 In the
personal matter, he was accused of fabricating a document and forging
a signature in a civil case; in his judicial capacity, he summarily
dismissed cases without allowing police testimony, thereby allegedly
using the power of his office to promote personal interests. 8 ° Because
the consent agreement ended the matter without a full disclosure of
London's alleged misconduct, the facts are difficult to determine,
especially because London later claimed that he voluntarily resigned his
judicial offices, rather than being forced out, and that his resignation
had nothing to do with either the Judicial Qualifications Commission or
the supreme court.'
Perhaps the most amazing part of this story,
however, is not that London received his license to practice without
graduating from law school, 8 ' but that he became a judge after being
disbarred in 1982,18 following his conviction for forgery.'
VI.

ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENTS AND SETTLEMENT AUTHORITY

Clark v. Perino'8' is one of a seemingly endless series of cases in
which defendants seek to enforce a settlement entered into by a
plaintiff's attorney, allegedly without the client's authority to do so. In
1990 Clark hired a lawyer, Parker, to sue Perino and Perino's employer,
IBM, for injuries she suffered in a traffic accident. During the pendency
of her suit, she filed a pro se bankruptcy petition, for which she was
granted a discharge in August 1994. Nowhere in her bankruptcy papers
did Clark mention the lawsuit against Perino and IBM. Meanwhile, in
May 1994 Parker settled the accident case with counsel for defendants.
Parker claimed that Clark agreed to the settlement on May 19.
However, Clark claimed not only that she refused to settle for the
amount Parker suggested, but also that she fired Parker on May 10.
After Clark received the settlement documents for execution, she wrote

179. Id. at 2, 4, 508 S.E.2d at 383, 384.
180. Emily Heller, ProbeEnds N. Ga. Judge'sCheckered Legal Career,FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Oct. 22, 1998, at 1.

181.
182.

Id.
Id.

183. Technically, the supreme court accepted his voluntary surrender of his license to
practice law, but it did so with "the express stipulation that the effect thereof is
tantamount to disbarment." In re London, 249 Ga. 790, 790, 294 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1982).
184. United States v. London, 714 F.2d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir. 1983). London was also
indicted for defrauding the Farmers Home Administration. See United States v. London,
550 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1977).
185. 235 Ga. App. 444, 509 S.E.2d 707 (1998).
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Perino a letter stating that the $25,000 settlement was unacceptable and
threatening to fire Perino if certain conditions were not satisfied."' 6
The court of appeals dealt with the simple question of whether the
settlement agreement entered into by Clark's attorney of record was
enforceable against Clark if Clark did not authorize such a settlement.
The court held that Clark was bound by the agreement because
precedent and general principles of agency law allowed opposing counsel
to rely on Perino's apparent authority.187 Therefore, even if Clark fired
Perino on May 10, as she claimed, the agreement was still enforceable
because opposing counsel had no notice of Perino's termination. 8 8 The
only way a client can avoid being bound by an unauthorized settlement
agreement is to demonstrate that the apparent authority presumptively
possessed by the attorney did not exist at the time of settlement.189
This can be done in one of two ways. One way is that the client can
expressly and directly communicate the lack of authority to opposing
counsel. The other way is that opposing counsel can have notice of the
lack of authority.
Direct communication with opposing counsel presents a difficult
dilemma for that attorney. If the client calls opposing counsel, opposing
counsel should be very reluctant to speak with the client, given the
possibilities that this communication could be misinterpreted. 9 °
Although the court suggested that opposing counsel's awareness that the
lawyer has no authority to settle might relieve the client from being
bound by an agreement, the court found insufficient awareness in this
case."19 Clark argued that opposing counsel was sufficiently surprised
at Parker's acceptance of the defense offer to vitiate any apparent
authority he had to settle.'92 The court rejected this argument,
holding that
[E]ven if Scott [the opposing counsel] were "surprised"... that Parker
accepted the previously rejected offer. . ., this surprise did not prevent
him from relying upon Parker's apparent authority .... The fact that
this acceptance represented a change in a party's prior position on

186. Id. at 444, 447, 509 S.E.2d at 709, 711.
187.

Id. at 448-49, 509 S.E.2d at 712 (citing Brumbelow v. Northern Propane Gas Co.,

251 Ga. 674, 675-77, 308 S.E.2d 544, 547 (1983)).
188. Id. at 449, 509 S.E.2d at 712.
189. Id.
190. See GA. BAR RuLES Rule 4-102(d), Standard 47 ("During the course of his
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not communicate ... on the subject of the

representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless
he has the prior written consent of the lawyer representing such other party . . .
191. 235 Ga. App. at 450, 509 S.E.2d at 713.
192. Id.
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settlement... is insufficient to support such a finding. Any number
of reasons could explain such a change of heart.
... Scott was entitled to rely upon Parker's status as Clark's
attorney of record.... unless and until any limitationon thatauthority
was communicated to him.193
Tekin v. Whiddon' 94 raised a question about the enforceability of a
litigation settlement agreement.
The Whiddons filed a medical
malpractice claim against Tekin, Metropolitan Anesthesiology Associates,
and a nurse anesthetist, all of whom St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co. insured under two policies, the "D" and "E" policies. Although St.
Paul did not produce the policies as plaintiffs requested, it agreed to
make them available for inspection, but plaintiffs never inspected them
prior to trial. On the last day of trial, a St. Paul representative told
plaintiffs of the "D" policy's existence but made no mention of the "E"
policy. This representation clearly understated the amount of coverage
available for defendants under all policies. Shortly thereafter, counsel
for the parties reached an oral "high/low" agreement, using $1,600,000
and $600,000 as the high and low limits. However, counsel for plaintiffs
insisted that the agreement was conditioned on St. Paul's certification
that the coverage limit disclosed was the full amount of coverage for all
defendants. After announcing the settlement agreement to the judge,
the jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs for more than $5 million.
Several days later, when plaintiffs' counsel learned the whole truth
about the insurance policies, he renounced the settlement, arguing that
its condition precedent had not been met. The trial court entered
judgment on the verdict and denied defendants' motion to enforce the
settlement agreement because it found that there was no enforceable

written agreement. 195
The court of appeals opinion, which affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, turned on the terms of the agreement-specifically, whether
19
certification of the insurance coverage was a condition precedent. 6
The court noted that because the parties disputed this fact, defendants
had the burden of proving the existence of a writing because they were

the proponents of the agreement.197 The court rejected defendants'
argument that their lawyer's handwritten notes satisfied this writing
requirement, holding that they "did not memorialize all the essential
terms of the settlement and [that] the trial court was authorized to

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 450-51, 509 S.E.2d at 713 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
233 Ga. App. 645, 504 S.E.2d 722 (1998).
Id. at 645-46, 504 S.E.2d at 723-24.
Id. at 646-47, 504 S.E.2d at 724.
Id. at 647, 504 S.E.2d at 724.
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conclude that the notes did not constitute a valid and enforceable
agreement."'9 8 This suggests that a court would have been authorized
to find that a complete memorialization of the terms solely in the
handwritten private notes of one party's counsel would constitute an
enforceable written agreement, which is surely a curious result.
The court dispelled this notion in the second part of the opinion, which
makes it clear that settlement agreements do not have to be written to
be enforceable. 199 The court held that "[tihe trial court was also
authorized to find that there was no enforceable oral settlement
agreement" because "the minds of the parties did not meet at the same
time, upon the same subject matter, and in the same sense concerning
the certification of the amount of insurance coverage."200 Plaintiffs
always insisted that the agreement was enforceable if and only if
defendants certified the existence of insurance coverage, which they did
not do according to plaintiffs' understanding of the agreement. Thus, the
whole case seemed to turn, not on whether the agreement was in
writing, but rather on whether defendants met their part of the bargain,
in the absence of which the settlement agreement was no agreement at
all.
VII. ATTORNEYS' LIENS
In Ellis, Funk, Goldberg, Labovitz & Dokson, P.C. v. Kleinberger,2 °'
the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment declaring the
attorneys' lien cancelled and forfeited.2 2 Ellis, Funk, Goldberg,
Labovitz & Dotson ("EFGL&D") represented a businessman, Kleinberger,
in the sale of his business. A dispute that arose after the sale was
resolved in arbitration, the result being that the contract was slightly
modified. Following the arbitration, the buyer was to make monthly
installment payments to Kleinberger for some time. In May 1997, after
paying EFGL&D over $95,000 in attorney fees, Kleinberger informed
EFGL&D that he was not satisfied with the firm's services and fees. In
response, the firm filed an attorneys' lien,2 °3 claiming that Kleinberger

198. Id., 504 S.E.2d at 725.
199. Id. at 648, 504 S.E.2d at 725.

200. Id.
201. 235 Ga. App. 360, 509 S.E.2d 660 (1998).
202. Id. at 361-62, 509 S.E.2d at 662.
203. According to the court, EFGL&D asserted its lien under O.C.G.A. section 15-1914(b), which gives attorneys what is generally known as a "charging lien." Specifically, this
section gives attorneys liens "[u]pon actions, judgments, and decrees for money." O.C.G.A.
§ 15-19-14(b) (1999). Although the court did not say so, the underlying decree must have
been the arbitration award.
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stilled owed over $60,000 in attorney fees, and gave notice thereof to
Kleinberger and the purchaser of his business, who was to make several
more monthly installment payments to Kleinberger. When Kleinberger
filed a traverse, the firm continued to receive and hold the buyer's
installment checks, which were made jointly payable to Kleinberger and
to the firm,2"4 but it made no attempt to foreclose the lien judicially.
The trial court held an untranscribed hearing, presumably on the
traverse, after which it cancelled the lien because it found no evidence
supporting the firm's claim for further attorney fees and because the
firm did not enforce its lien in compliance with O.C.G.A. section 15-19-15
as O.C.G.A. section 44-14-550 requires.2" 5 The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that "lien laws, including the attorneys' lien statute,
must be strictly construed" because they are "in derogation of the
common law."20 6
However, EFGL&D's argument that O.C.G.A. sections 15-19-15 and
44-14-550 were inapplicable appears to have merit. The firm filed a lien,
expressly relying upon O.C.G.A. section 15-19-14(b), which applies only
to "actions, judgments, and decrees for money."20 7 It did not rely upon
O.C.G.A. section 15-19-14(a), which gives attorneys a lien on "all papers
and money of their clients in their possession for services rendered."2 8
O.C.G.A. section 15-19-14 is silent about methods of foreclosing or
enforcing liens. Only O.C.G.A. section 15-19-15 addresses that subject,
and it provides that "[1]iens of attorneys at law in possession of personal
property under a lien for fees shall be satisfied according to Code Section
44-14-550. "209 O.C.G.A. section 44-14-550 provides that the lienholder

must institute foreclosure proceedings within ten days of the client's
demand.2 10 Thus, a comparison of subsections (a) and (b) of O.C.G.A.
section 15-19-14 shows that only subsection (a) refers to a client's
property in the attorney's possession. Similarly, O.C.G.A. section 44-14550, through O.C.G.A. section 15-19-15, applies only to liens of attorneys

204.

[F]unds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or
potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited [in the
lawyer's or law firm's trust account], but the portion belonging to the
lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of
the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which
event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute
is finally resolved.
GA. BAR RULES DR 9-102(A)(2).
205. 235 Ga. App. at 360-61, 509 S.E.2d at 661.
206. Id. at 361, 509 S.E.2d at 661.
207. O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b).
208. Id. § 15-19-14(a).
209. Id. § 15-19-15 (1999) (emphasis added).
210. Id. § 44-14-550(1) (1982).
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who are "in possession of personal property under a lien for fees."2 n
The similarity between the phrases "personal property" (in O.C.G.A.
section 15-19-15) and "papers and money of their clients in their
possession" (in O.C.G.A. section 15-19-14(a)), coupled with the disparity
between the phrases "personal property" (in O.C.G.A. section 15-19-15)
and "actions, judgments, and decrees" (in O.C.G.A. section 15-19-14(b)),
logically leads to the conclusion that because EFGL&D expressly filed
its lien under O.C.G.A. section 15-19-14(b), the foreclosure requirements
of O.C.G.A. section 44-14-550 did not apply.
The court's contrary conclusion is curious given that it was required
to construe the statute strictly. Indeed, the court's conclusion seems to
contradict its holding in Hester v. Chalker.2
In Hester the court of
appeals held that O.C.G.A. section 15-19-14 "permits but does not
require enforcement of attorney liens by means of mortgage and
foreclosure."2 13 The court rejected EFGL&D's argument based on
Hester, however, because Hester involved real property. Why that
distinction should affect the result, however, is not explained.
VIII.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Every year dozens of convicts appeal their convictions, alleging that
the convictions should be set aside because of the ineffective assistance
of their counsel. The vast majority of these claims continue to be
rejected, usually on the ground that the lawyer's actions were matters
of strategy immune from attack or that there was no discernible
prejudice from the lawyer's conduct that deprived the defendant of a fair
trial.214 This survey period included four cases that stand out, the first
of which could have radically changed criminal practice in Georgia had
the supreme court not reversed the court of appeals.
In Fogarty v. State,21 5 Mark Fogarty was charged with twelve counts
of kidnapping, aggravated assault, and various other charges against
nine women in Gwinnett County. Fogarty, who was represented by Don
Hudson, was acquitted of six charges and convicted on six. Fogarty
moved for a new trial, in part based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Specifically, Fogarty argued that Hudson charged him an illegal

211. Id. § 15-19-15.
212. 222 Ga. App. 783, 476 S.E.2d 79 (1996).
213. Id. at 784, 476 S.E.2d at 81.
214. See, e.g., Slade v. State, 270 Ga. 305, 307-08, 509 S.E.2d 618, 621 (1998) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (requiring a claimant to show that counsel's
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance adversely affected the
outcome of the case)).
215. 270 Ga. 609, 513 S.E.2d 493 (1999).
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contingent fee, which created an unacceptable conflict between Fogarty's
interest (receiving competent representation by a lawyer who pursues all
leads to gain an acquittal) and Hudson's interest (collecting the highest
fee possible). Fogarty's argument was based on the contract his wife
signed in retaining Hudson. It provided that Fogarty would pay $25,000
for the representation in advance, but that $15,000 would be refunded
if all charges against him were dismissed and another suspect was
identified.2 16
The court of appeals agreed that the fee arrangement was an improper
contingent fee, but the court did not reverse Fogarty's conviction.2 17
Citing no authority, the court stated:
Clearly defendant is correct that such an agreement constitutes a
contingency fee contract in a criminal case and is improper. Defendant
also is correct in his assertion that the fee agreement created an actual
conflict of interest for his trial counsel in that it made it more lucrative
for trial counsel not to pursue avenues that might lead to dismissal of
the charges
against defendant and the identification of a new sus218
pect.
This statement has an appealing logic. After all, the client wants the
lawyer to work as long and hard as possible, to charge as little as
possible, and to obtain the best result possible. On the other hand, the
lawyer wants to work as little as possible, to charge as much as possible,
and to obtain the best result possible. Thus, on two out of three counts,
the lawyer's and the client's interests directly conflict-so much so that
it is impossible to maximize each of their goals at the same time.
However, it should be obvious that this is always true. Unless lawyers
quit charging their clients, a conflict of interest will always exist in all
fee arrangements, including contingent fee agreements in civil cases,
because of conflicting incentives. The more work the lawyer does, the
more of a chance there is that he can exploit a hole in the prosecution's
case and win. At the same time, the more work the lawyer does for one
client, the less time he has to pursue other clients, other cases, and other
fees. The dilemma is insoluble.
In addition, there is no meaningful difference between the contract in
Fogarty and the typical fee arrangement that criminal defense lawyers
make with their client. Criminal defense lawyers typically charge a
"step-up fee," under which they charge a certain amount for representa-

216.
217.

Fogarty v. State, 231 Ga. App. 57, 57-58, 497 S.E.2d 628, 629, 630 (1998).

Id. at 59, 497 S.E.2d at 630.
218. Id. (emphasis added). Despite this finding, the court affirmed the trial court's
denial of Fogarty's motion for a new trial because Hudson's performance was not adversely
affected by this conflict. Id.
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tion up to or through a certain part of the process (such as indictment),
an additional amount if the case goes to trial, and another amount if the
case is appealed.219 Under this fee arrangement, a client who goes
through two stages will owe less than a client who goes through three.
Indeed, that is the way it should be because the more stages there are,
the more work the lawyer does, and the more the lawyer is justified in
charging.
On appeal the supreme court clearly recognized this principle.
Although the supreme court affirmed the court of appeals judgment, it
rejected the court of appeals reasoning.22 ° The court agreed that "'[An
agreement for payment of one amount if the case is disposed of without
trial and a larger amount if it proceeds to trial is not a contingent fee
but merely an attempt to relate the fee to the time and service
involved.'" 22' That being so, if a step-up fee is acceptable, there is no
logical reason why a "step-down fee" (i.e., refunding what is not earned)
should be treated any differently.
Georgia's Standards seem to endorse the same approach. A lawyer
may not collect a clearly excessive fee.222 If the amount of work done
and the fee charged are grossly disproportional, the fee collected would
violate Standard 31, regardless of what the contract provides. In
addition, a lawyer must "refund promptly any part of a fee paid in
advance that has not been earned."22
The difficulty here seems to revolve around the use of the word
"contingent." Justice Sears seized on that point in her concurring
opinion, which emphasized the uncertainty of the event in question.224

219. Ironically, this may be closer to what actually happened than what the contract
indicated. Hudson claims that, despite the contract's language, "the defendant's family
paid $15,000 before the indictment and then an additional $10,000." June D. Bell, Justices
OKFee.Rebate Deal in Criminal Case, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Mar. 26, 1999, at 1.
220. 270 Ga. at 610, 513 S.E.2d at 497.
221. Id. at 611-12, 513 S.E.2d at 496 (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Standard 4-3.3 commentary at 4-37 (2d ed. 1980)) (alteration by court).
222. GA. BAR RULES Rule 4-102(d), Standard 31(a).
223. GA. BAR RULES Rule 4-102(d), Standard 23. Literally, Standard 23 applies only
to a lawyer who withdraws from employment. However, because a client has no need for
the lawyer's services after the case ends, and because a lawyer must withdraw if a client
discharges him, this distinction seems insignificant. Justice Fletcher seems to agree with
this point. See Greer, KIosik & Daugherty v. Yetman, 269 Ga. 271, 275, 496 S.E.2d 693,
696 (1998) (Fletcher, P.J., concurring) (contemplating situations in which "both professional
and ethical obligations [may] require reconsideration of the fee arrangement"). What
application this principle has to a nonrefundable retainer is a question the Georgia courts
have never really addressed.
224. 270 Ga. at 614, 513 S.E.2d at 497-98 (Sears, J., concurring specially) (citing
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 290 (5th ed. 1979)).
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Thus, because the fee actually earned is not initially assured or certain,
it must be literally contingent.225
The majority never tackled this point directly, shunning the hairsplitting definitions and trying to focus on the inherent nature of the
prohibited fees we call "contingent."2 2 6 The majority noted that "[t]he
'critical element' in a contingency fee contract 'is that there be some
chance that the lawyer will not receive the fee because the representation ends with an unwanted result for the lawyer's client.'"227 Because
"the agreement did not provide that counsel would be paid only in the
event that the case against Fogarty was dismissed or he was acquitted,"
the contract was not in violation of the rule.228
What is truly fascinating to consider about this case, however, is not
the argument over definitions, but rather the policy that underlies the
prohibition. If the contract clearly violated the policy, the precise
contours of the definition of the word could be ignored. According to
Justice Sears, the real point of the rule is the lack of the res out of which
a fee could be paid,229 which is often trumpeted as a justification for
the rule.2 0 However, it is difficult to see why that would require such
a rule. After all, reverse contingent fee arrangements, under which a
defendant pays the lawyer according to how much the lawyer saves, are
not universally condemned even though there is no res in such cases
either. Interestingly, while the Model Rules and Georgia's Proposed
Rule 1.5 both continue the prohibition, neither offers any explanation of
its purpose.
In Williams v. Duffy,2"' defendant raised a claim that went to the
heart of his lawyer's competence, or at least to the quality of advice he
gave Duffy. Charged with armed robbery and other offenses, Duffy hired
counsel, who negotiated a plea bargain whereby the state would
23 2
recommend a fifteen-year sentence. Under a recently adopted law,
Duffy was ineligible for parole for any of the sentence. Duffy claimed
that he did not learn of this law until after his plea was accepted and he
was sentenced. He filed a habeas corpus petition claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel.233

225.

Id. at 614-15, 513 S.E.2d at 498.

226. 270 Ga. at 611-13, 513 S.E.2d at 496-97.
227. Id. at 611, 513 S.E.2d at 496 (quoting WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 526).
228. Id. at 612, 513 S.E.2d at 496.
229. Id. at 614-15, 513 S.E.2d at 498 (Sears, J., concurring specially).
230. See GA. BAR RULEs EC 2-20.
231. 270 Ga. 580, 513 S.E.2d 212 (1999).
232. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1(c)(3) (Supp. 1999).
233. 270 Ga. at 580, 513 S.E.2d at 213.
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The supreme court rejected Duffy's argument, noting that he was
required to show both attorney error and a "'reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
Calling his ineligibility for parole
have insisted on going to trial.'" 2
the court reversed the habeas
his
sentence,
of
consequence
collateral
a
court's grant of Duffy's petition to set aside his conviction.235 In so
holding, the court overruled Hutchison v.237State23 6 because it was
"clearly contrary to the weight of authority."
In overruling Hutchison, the court cited nine cases as evidence of the
weight of authority, but none of them was decided by a Georgia
court.238 Moreover, the court did not mention one factor that was
apparently important to the court of appeals when it decided Hutchison.
In Hutchison the lawyer not only failed to inform his client of the parole
rule changes but also was unaware of them altogether. 23 9 Even if the
lawyer's failure to inform the client of the information was excusable on
the ground that the lawyer thought it was an insignificant factor in
deciding whether to accept or reject the plea, it seems that such a
decision would have to be deliberate. In other words, the lawyer would
have to know the information to decide what to do with it.
Given that the vast majority of criminal convictions are obtained by
plea bargain rather than by trial, 2 ° it seems that a complete understanding of the sentencing implications of a client's case would be one of
a defense lawyer's most significant assets. To suggest that a lawyer who
has such information need not communicate it to the client would, of
course, be ridiculous. Indeed, this is one area that the proposed Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct cover. Proposed Rule 1.4 provides that a
lawyer is required to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation." 241 Comment 2 to the proposed rule states that "[a]

234. Id. at 581, 513 S.E.2d at 213 (quoting Brantley v. State, 264 Ga. 151, 152, 486
S.E.2d 169, 171 (1997)).

235. Id. at 581-82, 513 S.E.2d at 214.
236.

230 Ga. App. 143, 495 S.E.2d 618 (1998).

237. 270 Ga. at 582, 513 S.E.2d at 214.
238. Id. at 581-82, 513 S.E.2d at 214. The court also cited an ALR Annotation that
cites several Georgia cases, but none are directly on point.
239. 230 Ga. App. at 144, 495 S.E.2d at 619.
240. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 31.01[B], at 560
(2d ed. 1997) (noting that over 90% of all federal and state convictions are the result of
guilty pleas or pleas of nolo contendere). In Georgia during 1998, 95% of felony convictions
and 97% of misdemeanor convictions were obtained by plea. Letter from Holly K.O.
Sparrow, Assistant Director for Research, Judicial Council of Georgia, to Suzanne Mucklow,
Librarian, Georgia State University College of Law (Sept. 24, 1999) (on file with author).
241. PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4.
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lawyer who receives from opposing counsel ... a proffered plea bargain
in a criminal case should promptly inform the client of its substance."242 Comment 3 further states that "[t]he guiding principle is
that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for
information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests,
and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representa24
tion." 3
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice go even further, providing
that "[u]nder no circumstances should a lawyer recommend to a
defendant acceptance of a plea unless full investigation and study of the
case has been completed, including an analysis of controlling law and the
evidence likely to be introduced at trial."244 All professional conduct
rules make it clear beyond peradventure that the decisions on what plea
the client should enter and what plea agreement the client should accept
are decisions
to be made by the client in consultation with the law5
24

yer.

Actually, the responsibility for making sure that the defendant
understands what he is agreeing to is not limited to the defense
attorney. Georgia superior court judges are admonished to inform any
defendant wishing to enter a plea of "the maximum possible sentence on
the charge, including that possible from consecutive sentences and
enhanced sentences where provided by law; and/or of the mandatory
minimum sentence, if any, on the charge."24 Furthermore, as Justice
Fletcher points out in his dissent in Duffy, it is not obvious that the
minimal requirements a judge must meet to determine that a plea is
voluntary are the same as the minimal responsibilities counsel must
meet to fulfill his obligations to the client.247
Even if the law does not impose a specific enforceable duty on counsel
to fully advise clients of information regarding the possibility of parole,
the court's assumption that such information simply is not all that
important to a defendant seems cavalier at best. This is particularly
true in a case like Duffy, in which defendant's plea "required [him] to
serve one year more than if he
had been tried, found guilty, and
24
sentenced to life imprisonment." 8

242.

PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 cmt. 2.
PROPOSED GA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 cmt. 3.
244. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-6.1.
245. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-5.2(a); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC
7-7.
243.

246. GA. UNIF. R. SUPER. CT. 33.8(C)(2)-(3).
247. 270 Ga. at 583, 513 S.E.2d at 215 (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting).
248. Id.
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Pruitt v. State249 involved an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

in what has to be fairly unusual circumstances. Pruitt was charged with
murder, rape, child molestation, and several other violent and sexrelated offenses.250 The police arrested Pruitt on April 10, 1992, and
he remained incarcerated for more than four years before the trial
occurred.251 A jury found Pruitt guilty of all charges, and he was
sentenced to death. 252 During most of the time between Pruitt's arrest
and trial, he was represented by lead counsel Robert Chandler.25
In July 1995 the District Attorney hired Chandler to represent him in
an unrelated personal matter. After the trial court found out about this
in August, it held a hearing in October to determine whether Pruitt was
willing to waive his right to conflict-free counsel and continue with
Chandler as his attorney. Although he initially consented, he changed
his mind in January 1996, and in March 1996 the court removed
Chandler and appointed a new lawyer.254
After Pruitt was convicted and sentenced to death, he challenged his
conviction on several grounds, including an allegation that Chandler's
concurrent representation of him and the District Attorney during his
case was a conflict of interest that constituted reversible error.255 The
Court rejected Pruitt's challenge, however, concluding the following:
The concurrent representation of a defendant in a capital case and the
district attorney seeking the death penalty against the defendant is an
obvious conflict. However, without addressing the issue of waiver, we
conclude that Pruitt does not show any harm resulting from this
simultaneous representation ....

In order to prevail on his claim,

Pruitt must show... the existence of an actual conflict of interest that
adversely affected his lawyer's performance ....
... [T]his is not a situation where the prosecutor previously
represented the defendant, and there is no evidence that the district
attorney gained any information about Pruitt's defense through his
personal retention of one of Pruitt's attorneys. In fact, Pruitt does not
allege that Chandler divulged any information acquired in the
representation of Pruitt to the district
attorney, or that Chandler
26
assisted the prosecution in any way. 1

249. 270 Ga. 745, 514 S.E.2d 639 (1999).
250. Id. at 745 & n.2, 514 S.E.2d at 643 & n.2.

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 748, 514 S.E.2d at 645.
Id. at 745 & n.2, 514 S.E.2d at 643 & n.2.

Id. at 752, 514 S.E.2d at 648.
Id.
Id. at 752-53, 514 S.E.2d at 648.
Id. at 753, 514 S.E.2d at 648-49 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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Thus, the court rejected Pruitt's claim even though Chandler's
concurrent representation was an obvious conflict. It appears that the
court focused on two concerns. The first was whether the prosecutor had
any special knowledge about Pruitt from previously representing him.
The court concluded that the prosecutor did not have such knowledge.257 The other was whether the District Attorney gained any
retention of Chandler. Certainly, there
unfair advantage through his 258
either.
that
of
evidence
no
was
While these are valid concerns, they are not the only concerns.
Indeed, they may not even be the most important concerns because both
possibilities seem rather remote. Rather, the most serious concern
should have been about loyalty and the zealous representation of Pruitt
by a lawyer who had a financial incentive (no matter how insignificant)
to please another client, the District Attorney. In other words, the
question is not so much whether the District Attorney improperly got
any information from Chandler, but rather whether "the exercise of
[Chandler's] professional judgment on behalf of [Pruitt was] affected by
his own financial, business, property or personal interests."2 59
This has to be the primary concern in a case like this because human
nature is such that a lawyer cannot independently consider the interests
of a client when the disposition of the client's interests affects the
lawyer's interests. Although Pruitt filed several motions that the court
denied, including a motion to dismiss that claimed he was denied the
right to a speedy trial, there is no indication how the District Attorney
responded to them.2 60 As to Pruitt's claim that he was denied the
right to a speedy trial, which he made after Chandler was removed from
the case, the court denied the motion partly because Pruitt filed it so
late.2 6' However, this does not prove that Chandler maneuvered to
retain the District Attorney as his client. While there was no evidence
that Chandler or the District Attorney had done anything that affected
Pruitt's case, the point of the conflicts rules is not just to reprimand
those who engage in conduct that is shown to have a negative effect on
the client's rights. Rather, the rules are intended to protect the integrity
of the judicial process, something the court seemed to forget in Pruitt.
Cornwell v. Dodd 2 seems to be the easiest and least controversial
of the four cases. Cornwell pleaded guilty to theft by taking but later

257.
258.

Id.
Id.

259. GA. BAR RULES Rule 4-102(d), Standard 30.
260. 270 Ga. at 748-56, 514 S.E.2d at 645-50.
261.
262.

Id. at 748-59, 514 S.E.2d at 645.
270 Ga. 411, 509 S.E.2d 919 (1999).
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petitioned for habeas corpus relief on the ground that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer, Jerry Drayton, was
suspended from the practice of law while he represented Cornwell. The
basis for Drayton's suspension was his failure to comply with continuing
legal education requirements and his failure to pay the licensing fee.26
Following the majority of state and federal courts, the supreme court
held that a lawyer does not cease to be a lawyer for Sixth Amendment
purposes merely because he has been suspended for not paying dues or
attending continuing legal education classes. 26 The court reasoned
that violating a technical bar rule does not render a lawyer suddenly
incompetent. 265 Thus, the court held that "failure to comply with state
bar administrative regulations" does not itself render assistance of
counsel ineffective under the United States Constitution or the Georgia
Constitution. 66
This decision seems correct and sensible, but the court, in refusing to
adopt a per se rule, left open the possibility that this may not always be
the result when a defendant's lawyer has been suspended.267 Indeed,
it is difficult to see any connection between a lawyer's competence and
the failure to make timely payments of dues or to comply with some
other purely administrative obligation. However, the failure to attend
CLE classes, especially over an extended period of time, could raise such
a problem. The purpose of CLE classes is to keep lawyers current,
thereby reducing the chances of incompetent practice. At some point,
then, failure to keep current by attending CLE classes may result in a
lawyer falling far enough behind to be considered incompetent.
However, because CLE requirements are checked annually, it should be
nearly impossible for a lawyer to fall too far behind in CLE obligations
without being suspended for failure to comply with the requirements.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Compared to many years, this survey period was relatively quiet in
the field of legal ethics. There were very few bold, new pronouncements,
and with the exception of Hutchison, no major decisions were overruled.
The next survey period, however, could prove to be a watershed year.
Perhaps the next issue will begin with the phrase, "This year, Georgia
finally joined the more than forty states who have adopted the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct." Or maybe it will say, "Thousands

263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 411, 509 S.E.2d at 920.
Id.
Id. at 412, 509 S.E.2d at 920.
Id., 509 S.E.2d at 921.

267. Id., 509 S.E.2d at 920.
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of trees throughout Georgia breathed a collective sigh of relief this year
when the Georgia General Assembly finally repealed the malpractice
affidavit rule. Almost immediately, the court of appeals caseload
dropped significantly for the first time in years."

